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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the legal barriers to apply project finance for building nuclear power 
plants. Countries such as the UK, Turkey and emerging economies (i.e. Malaysia and 
Indonesia) are increasingly seeking to attract private investors for nuclear projects using project 
finance. This is an innovative approach, and until now the only cases registered are Hinckley 
Point C in the UK and Akkuyu in Turkey. This paper scrutinises the mismatches between the 
requirements of project finance and nuclear law. Nuclear law introduces specific requirements 
affecting the security interest of private lenders, hindering the bankability of nuclear projects 
on a non-recourse basis. The paper emphasises that the performance-based regulatory approach 
is more compatible with project finance compared to the prescriptive based one. Furthermore, 
the paper examines the gaps between nuclear and holistic energy law, looking at the financing 
of energy infrastructures. Improving nuclear law enables to apply project finance to nuclear 
power plants, facilitating their deployment. Consequently, nuclear law plays a central role in 
promoting sustainable energy mixes characterised by reduced carbon emissions. 
 
KEYWORDS:  nuclear law, energy law, project financing, Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV), Special Project Entity (SPE), sustainability
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing interest in energy law. Energy law scholars advocate the need for a holistic 
and cohesive energy law to improve the quality of decision-making of both judges and 
policymakers (Heffron et al., 2018; Talus, 2014). Traditionally, energy law was a 
heterogeneous field composed of sub-domains such as petroleum law, nuclear law, and others. 
The conception of energy law as a holistic and autonomous legal domain is relatively recent 
(Bradbrook, 1996), whilst its sub-domains have a long tradition. Energy law scholars identified 
common principles to enhance the consistency of the different sub-domains, as well as to guide 
the development of energy law toward a coherent evolution (Heffron & Talus, 2016b). 
Nuclear law concerns the management of nuclear power and can be considered as a sub-domain 
of energy law. But if nuclear law is mainly concerned with nuclear safety and security, energy 
law has a broader focus. This paper assesses the dichotomy between nuclear law and energy 
law. In particular, it focuses on the application of a popular financing approach called Project 
Financing (PF). This financial method is widely applied to all types of power infrastructure 
with the exception of the nuclear sector. This paper identifies the major inconsistencies 
between the objectives of holistic energy law in comparison with nuclear law. The paper 
identifies the barriers of PF induced by nuclear law. Overcoming these barriers would narrow 
the gap between nuclear law and the holistic energy law. 
Section 1.1 defines energy law, introducing the underlying principles and historical stages of 
development. Section 1.2 defines nuclear law, describes its focus and compares its stages of 
development compared to the holistic energy law. Section 2 introduces PF and highlights the 
requirements conflicting with nuclear law, namely: the completion risk and the security interest 
of lenders. Section 3 describes the aspects of nuclear law conflicting with the requirements of 
PF. Section 4 concludes with the applicability of PF to nuclear law. The understanding  of PF 
enables the gap between nuclear law and energy law to be assessed. Energy and Policy Law 
3 
 
Energy law focuses on the management of  energy resources (Heffron & Talus, 2016a). In 
particular, ³WKH DOORFDWLRQ RI ULJKWV DQG GXWLHV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH H[SORLWDWLRQ RI DOO HQHUJ\
resources between individuals, between individuals and the government, between governments 
DQGEHWZHHQVWDWHV´ (Bradbrook, 1996).  
Energy law relates to energy policy, both law and policy address the trade-off between  
economics, politics and  the environment; these trade-offs are also known as the energy 
trilemma, or triangle (Heffron, 2015). The economic aspects include the development of the 
electrical energy market, the trade in energy resources, and the financing of energy 
infrastructure. The political aspects IRFXVRQ WKHFRXQWU\¶V HQHUJ\VHFXULW\Meanwhile, the 
environmental aspects focus on climate change (e.g. greenhouse emissions), as well as, air, 
water and ground pollution. Both law and policy are applicable internationally, nationally and 
at lower territorial level, e.g. regions, cities, etc.  Governments formulate their energy policy 
based on a strategy that is then reflected in the energy law. Energy law incorporates standards, 
legal principles and mandatory provisions that regulate the production and supply of energy 
(Heffron et al., 2018).  
In the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in energy law as an autonomous and 
recognisable domain of law (Heffron et al., 2018). The term energy law is relatively recent, 
and it was in traduced by Bradbrook¶V seminal paper in 1996 (Bradbrook, 1996).  Legal 
thinking requires normative structures around developed legal domains, like criminal law, tort 
law, criminal law, etc. Heffron advocates for a holistic corpus of energy law enhancing the 
consistency and integration of legal norms, principles (Heffron & Talus, 2016b). Holistic 
energy law facilitates coherent jurisprudence that improves the quality and efficiency of court 
judgments. Holistic energy law favours the so-FDOOHG ³HQHUJ\ MXVWLFH´, which concerns the 
equitable aspects of energy management, including the affordability of energy for the society, 
as well as the environmental sustainability (Heffron & McCauley, 2017). Holistic energy law 
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also enables more effective decision-making for policymakers (Heffron & Talus, 2016b). The 
creation of a holistic legal domain is also justified by the unique nature of energy law, which 
is intrinsically interdisciplinary and spans technological, socio-economic, political and 
environmental areas. Energy law requires consistency across all these areas justifying the 
development of a holistic legal domain (Heffron et al., 2018; Talus, 2013, 2014). 
The recognition of energy law as a holistic domain is a relatively new concept, as most of the 
existing legal domains have long-lasting traditions. Similarly, the concepts of energy justice, 
environmental sustainability and the emphasis on climate change are all relatively recent ideas 
and concerns (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2016). Conversely, the sub-domains 
of energy law have a longer tradition and have evolved relatively independently. For example, 
the laws concerning fossil fuels and mineral extractions (e.g. lex Petrolia and lex mineralia) are 
relatively old and evolved separately from nuclear law, or the law regulating the electricity 
markets (Daintith, 2017; Talus, Looper & Otillar, 2012; Belyi & Talus, 2015). Fuel extraction 
and energy production are characterised by a variety of technologies, each with its own techno-
economic features, and environmental implications. Furthermore, the management of energy 
resources is also country-specific, meaning that different countries have different policies that 
are reflected in their energy law.  For example, some countries rich in minerals and fossil fuels 
focus on the extraction of oil & gas resources in order to foster their economic development. 
Conversely, other countries focus on energy security, developing policies that mostly concern 
on the diversification of the energy mix and fuel suppliers. Meanwhile, other countries 
concentrate on reducing greenhouse emissions by promoting low-carbon technologies. Since 
energy policy is country specific, energy law varies. Furthermore, both energy law and energy 
policy are deeply interrelated with other domains, such as environmental law, or the industrial 
policy (Talus, 2013; Heffron, 2015). These overlaps with other domains make it harder to 
define the scope of energy law.  
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To overcome the challenges coming from a dis-homogeneous energy law, scholars advocate 
for the creation of common energy law principles, which are not country or technology specific 
(Bradbrook, 1996; Heffron & Talus, 2016b). These main principles would constitute the basis 
for further integration of sub-legal domains of energy law. Under this perspective  Heffron et 
al. propose seven main principles: (1) national resource sovereignty, (2) access to modern 
energy services, (3) energy justice, (4) prudent, rational and sustainable use of natural 
resources, (5) protection of the environment, human health & combatting climate change, (6) 
energy security and reliability, and (7) resilience, (Heffron et al., 2018). Overall, these 
principles should guide energy law and policy (Heffron et al., 2018). 
To arrive at this holistic stage of development, energy law encompassed five main stages, as 
summarised in Table 1; these five stages highlight the trend in energy law. Internationally, the 
current priority to move towards a low carbon energy system. This idea of evolution is better 
described by the concept of JUST transition that is shared between climate, environmental and 
energy justice. JUST is the acronym made up of Justice, Universal, Space and Time; these are 
the four dimensions describing the facets of current energy law transitions (Heffron & 
McCauley, 2018). Three main forms of justice characterise JUST transition: distributional, 
procedural and restorative. JUST transition is universal in the sense that it is intrinsically 
recognised and it is internationally accepted. JUST transition takes place at multi-space levels, 
i.e. international, national and local. Time is a critical aspect of JUST transition as it brings the 
sense of urgency introducing chronological targets. 
The maturity of the energy law varies across countries. Similarly, each sub-legal domain has 
its focus considering both the main principles of energy law and their stages of development. 
This paper considers the nuclear law as part of energy law. In particular, it assesses whether 
nuclear law is consistent with the general trend in energy law.  To do so, the research focuses 
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on the use of PF since it enables to clearly distinguish the stages of development of energy law 
compared to nuclear law. 
Stage Period and Background Main focus of 
energy law 
Stage 1 
During the 19th and 20th century, the main source of energy 
production was coal. The health and safety aspects of the coal 
extraction were the main issues that energy law had to tackle. 
Safety 
Stage 2 
After WWII particular attention was given to the geopolitical 
security of energy sources, in order to avoid future war 
conflicts. 
Energy security 
Stage 3 
During the Cold War and after the oil crisis of 1970, the main 
focus was directed towards economic development. 
Neoclassic economics theories pushed some states toward the 
liberalisation of energy production. 
Economic 
development 
Stage 4 
The early 2000s until recent times. Energy law focused 
prevalently on the promotion and support of energy 
infrastructure, attracting private investors. 
Energy 
infrastructure 
development 
Stage 5 
From 2015 approximately, there was growing attention 
toward a more suitable and equitable energy impact into the 
society and environment, including the emphasis on climate 
change 
Energy Justice 
Table 1: The five stages of development, based on (Heffron & Talus, 2016a) 
 
1.1 Nuclear law as a component of holistic energy law 
This research focuses on nuclear law for the civil use of nuclear energy. With this respect, 
nuclear law can be considered as a branch of energy law (Handrlica, 2018). A formal definition 
of nuclear law is: ³WKHERG\RIVSHFLDOOHJDOQRUPVFUHDWHGWRUHJXODWHWKHFRQGXFWRIOHJDORU
natural persons engaged in activities related to fissionable materials, ionizing radiation and 
H[SRVXUH WR QDWXUDO VRXUFHV RI UDGLDWLRQ´ (IAEA, 2003a). Nuclear law is based on eleven 
principles: nuclear safety, nuclear security, responsibility,  permission, continuous control,  
compensation, sustainable development,  compliance,  independence,  transparency, and 
international co-operation (IAEA, 2003a, 2010b). The main objective of nuclear law concerns 
the safe and secure management of nuclear material. In particular, the scope of nuclear law lies 
on nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear safeguards and nuclear liability.  
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Compared to the five stages of development of energy law, nuclear law seems to remain at the 
first stage of development: safety. The emphasis on nuclear safety and security is justified by 
the nature of nuclear technology, and its potentially detrimental effect on people and the 
environment. Major accidents such as Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011 demonstrated 
the potential for catastrophic effects from nuclear accidents, which in turn impacted heavily on 
the development of nuclear law (Heffron, 2013; IAEA, 2002). Furthermore, some intrinsic 
features of nuclear technology match some principles of energy law (e.g. energy security), 
which does not need to be codified in the nuclear law (Heffron, McCauley & Sovacool, 2015). 
For example, the nuclear energy favours energy security, because nuclear fuel is relatively 
cheap (per amount of energy produced) and energy intensive (in volumetric terms) meaning 
that it is possible to supply and store vast amounts of fuel from multiple suppliers (Corner et 
al., 2011; Watson & Scott, 2009). Another example concerns environmental sustainability 
because nuclear energy can replace coal or gas as a baseload technology reducing greenhouse 
emissions. Therefore, nuclear law does not need to emphasise the sustainability of nuclear 
energy. 
Despite its potential, the generation of electricity by nuclear energy is controversial, and while 
some countries promote it, for example France and South Korea others exclude it due to  public 
opposition relating to radioactivity, potential accidents, location of plants, (Esposto, 2008), 
including. Ireland, Italy and Austria. Meanwhile, before the Chernobyl accident, many 
countries promoted the use of nuclear energy (Adamantiades & Kessides, 2009). However, 
major nuclear accidents such as those at Three Mile Island 1979 and Chernobyl 1986 had 
severe detrimental effects for  the nuclear sector (Hayashi & Hughes, 2013). Before these 
accidents, nuclear law was primarily focused on economic development, in line with the Stage 
3 of energy law. However, after the occurrence of these accidents, the focus shifted swiftly 
towards the nuclear safety and security aspects. After Chernobyl, many countries (e.g. Italy 
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and Spain) abandoned, or suspended, their nuclear programme, along with major investments 
in research and development. For some years the development of nuclear programmes stalled 
even though a notable exception, South Korea continued. This was the case until  the so-called 
³QXFOHDUUHQDLVVDQFH´of the early 2000s. However, the Fukushima accident had a major impact 
on public acceptability, and comparably to Chernobyl, it either stopped or slowed down the 
development of nuclear energy worldwide.  
Nuclear law is still mainly focused on nuclear safety and security. The major accidents stopped 
the evolution of nuclear law; indeed, it had regressed from stage three (economic development) 
to stage one (safety). The extensive focus on nuclear safety and security has major implications 
on the economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), which are extremely challenging projects 
exacerbated by  the prescriptiveness of safety norms and standards (IAEA, 2010b, 2003a, 2002; 
Heffron, 2013).  
However, recent examples, particularly in the UK, showed a growing interest in attracting 
private investors to consider investing in nuclear power  using PF (IAEA, 2014). PF has been 
widely used in all other types of energy infrastructure, including coal, CCGT and wind (Wang 
& Tiong, 2000; Kann, 2009; Esty, 2008). The wide use of PF in energy infrastructures is 
associable to stage 4 (Section 1.1 ± Table 1), which deals with energy infrastructure 
development.  
In the nuclear sector, the early attempts of PF include Hinkley Point C in the UK and Akkuyu 
in Turkey (IAEA, 2014). These nuclear projects are applying, for the first time in history, a 
nuclear development PF, which has about thirty years of experience in other energy 
infrastructures. Remarkably, in the nuclear sector, PF is not directly applicable to many 
jurisdictions because nuclear law is still outdated and act as a major obstacle to PF.  
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This paper identifies the barriers to PF derived from the mandatory provisions of nuclear law.  
This first step concerns the necessity to improve nuclear law, making it more consistent with 
the future development stages of the holistic energy law. Improving nuclear law would give 
effect to the concept of JUST transition characterising the current trend in energy law (Heffron 
& McCauley, 2018). In particular, improving the nuclear law would make deployment of NPPs 
more feasible in some countries, reducing the carbon emissions worldwide. 
To investigate the barriers of PF derived from nuclear law, it is crucial to consider the 
technicalities of both PF and nuclear law. PF requires the confidence of private investors who 
are assured by favouring banking, security and bankruptcy law. These aspects are discussed in 
Section 2.  
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2. The Project Financing of energy infrastructure 
Several authors have propounded  the idea of using PF (Finon & Roques, 2008; Barquin et al., 
2010) in the nuclear industry. NPPs are capital intensive projects that require the support of 
policy and decision makers (IAEA, 2006a).  Because of the higher investment risk, the cost of 
financing NPPs is higher than Coal plants or Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) (Taylor, 
2016).  
For nuclear programmes, the financing is a major challenge, especially when compared to other 
infrastructure sectors, for example conventional power projects, waste, and transportation.  PF 
can be utilised to overcome this challenge. In PF, the public provides limited and indirect forms 
of financial support (e.g. public concessions, financial guarantees and other similar measures), 
enabling the private sector to finance and develop infrastructure and deliver public services 
(Esty, 2008). The liberalisation that took place during the µ80s in Europe paved the way towards 
a novel financial and contractual techniques attracting private investors (Yescombe, 2013). The 
most significant technique is represented by PF (Vinter, Price & Lee, 2013). PF is ³Whe 
financing of the development or exploitation of a right, natural resource or other asset where 
the bulk of the financing is to be provided by way of debt and is to be repaid principally out of 
the assets being financed and their revenues.´ (Dentons, 2016) 
Early examples of PF can be traced back to the Renaissance. The development of the railway 
infrastructure in the UK in the 18th and 19th century further developed PF (Finnerty, 2011).   
However, it is only in the last 20-30 years that PF evolved due to the worldwide deregulation 
and liberalisation of public infrastructural services. Some of the modern financial techniques 
can be traced back to securitisation which was first introduced in the µ70s in the US by the 
³*RYHUQPHQW 1DWLRQDO 0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ´ *LQQLH-Mae) (Ketz, 2003). Since then, 
securitisation inspired new ways of exploiting PF in risky projects like off-shore platforms in 
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the North Sea in the µ90s, or power plants in the US in the µ80s1. In the µ90s the Private 
Financing Initiative (PFI), in the UK, and other options became a part of the overall assessment 
of Public-Private-Partnerships, PPP (Bing et al., 2005).  The PFI was adapted to a broad range 
of infrastructures, including roads, prisons, schools, hospitals, power plants and others 
(National Audit Office, 2006).  
PF is often compared to corporate finance. In PF, the debt is lent to an incorporated entity 
representing the project called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or Special Purpose Entity 
(SPE), i.e. ³DIHQFHGorganization KDYLQJOLPLWHGSUHGHILQHGSXUSRVHVDQGDOHJDOSHUVRQDOLW\´ 
(Sainati, Brookes & Locatelli, 2017). In corporate finance, lenders, lend money to the project 
sponsors. This has at least two key implications.  
Firstly, corporate finance LVD IRUPRI³RQ-EDODQFHVKHHW ILQDQFLQJ´, and the project debt is 
considered in the VSRQVRUV¶accounting statements. Lenders provide funds to the sponsors and 
not to the project directly. PF is instead an ³RII-balance sheet financing´as the debt to finance 
the project is not revealed on the accounting statements of the sponsors2. PF represents, 
therefore, a major opportunity for the sponsors who can expand their borrowing capacity, with 
limited repercussions on their credit metrics (Dailami & Leipziger, 1998; Esty, 2003). 
Secondly, in corporate finance, the capital is subject to the financial risk of the sponsors overall, 
and not to each project independently. If the sponsor bankrupts, lenders might lose their capital. 
Sponsors are usually large utilities that have differentiated investments and assets. Their credit 
risk depends on their multiple activities, investments and contractual obligations. For example, 
an utility might own different power plant technologies, such as coal, nuclear, CCGT, etc. In 
case of liquidation of the sponsor, lenders can have recourse to its assets to recover part or all 
                                                 
1
 One of the first laws devoted to project finance were: finance for independent power projects ("IPPs"), and the 
Private Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) 1978 
2
 This statement is generally valid. However, SPVs might have special accounting treatment in some jurisdictions. 
For example, it could be mentioned in the footnotes of the accounting statements. 
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of their lent capital. Therefore, FRUSRUDWHILQDQFHLVRIWHQ³FROODWHUDOLVHG´ that is to say the debt 
is backed by collaterals provided by the borrower, or sponsor (Gatti, 2018).   
In PF, the SPV is the borrower on behalf of its sponsors (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 2000). The SPV 
has no assets when debt is lent and is a brand-new incorporated vehicle for the specific project; 
OHJDONQRZQDVD³0DQRI6WUDZ´. Because RIWKH³bankruptcy remoteness´, the SPV reflects 
the credit risk of the project and not of its sponsors (Wood, 1995).  From the lenders 
perspective, the SPV has no assets to be used as collateral (Gatti, 2018); therefore, PF is a form 
RI³QRQ- recourse finance, or limited recourse finance´ (Finnerty, 2011). In practice, to make 
PF bankable, lenders might require collaterals OHDGLQJ WR ³VHPL-UHFRXUVH´ ILQDQFH (Vinter, 
Price & Lee, 2013). Additionally, in PF, the debt LV³DUWLILFLDOO\´secured using contracts and 
concessions safeguarding future cash flows from operation making the project business critical 
for PF.  
These two features would be particularly beneficial for the sponsors of NPPs. However, these 
advantages for sponsors are somehow counterbalanced by a higher risk exposition of lenders. 
Therefore, a legitimate question might be: Why would lenders provide debt to the SPV, with 
no or limited collateral at a lower cost? The answer lies in the concept of bankability. 
2.1 Bankability of PF transactions  
Bankability concerns the acceptability of risk balance between the project investors (Finnerty, 
2011). 7REH³EDQNDEOH´3)WUDQVDFWLRQVUHTXLUHDVXVWDLQDEOHEDODQFHRIULVNEHWZHHQOHQGHUV
sponsors and other critical project stakeholders (Flyvbjerg, 2013); together with the rigour of 
non-recourse revenue generation. 
In PF, lenders provide the most significant portion of the capital (i.e. 70-95%); therefore, they 
usually constitute the most significant and conservative investors (Gatti, 2018). For these 
reasons, the research focuses on the OHQGHU¶V perspective of in bankability requirements for PF. 
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In the literature, the bankability is addressed by (1) bank syndication, (2) accurate due 
diligence, (3) governance, and (4) reputation of sponsors.  
Firstly,  PF lenders are often organised in syndicates of banks (Gatti, 2018), i.e. consortia 
linking different financial institutions (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 2000). The syndication of banks has 
specific governance mechanisms simplifying the negotiation and administration of syndicated 
loan. Bank syndication allows banks to share and diversify the financing risks. 
Secondly,  due diligence allows better scrutiny of the projects (Vinter, Price & Lee, 2013; 
Delmon & Delmon, 2010) enhancing the Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) creating the 
preconditions for better projects (Artto, Ahola & Vartiainen, 2016; Merrow, 2011). Lenders of 
large capital sums are usually conservative investors (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 2000) influencing 
many project aspects including the selection of both technology and suppliers. Lenders favour 
proven technologies and stable contests in terms of economy, policy and law (Gatti, 2018). 
Thirdly, PF transactions are based on a coherent nexus of enforceable instruments producing 
the governance structure for the project. Lenders are the main financiers, and they have 
significant trading power as they require pervasive controlling powers toward the activities and 
performances of the SPV (Vinter, Price & Lee, 2013). Sometimes, lenders appoint shadow 
directors to the 639¶V board of directors having special veto power on critical decisions 
regarding changes of the project plan or budget. Additionally, lenders often impose 
independent auditors and technical assessor for the acceptance of project deliverables. These 
governance measures provide further confidence to lenders, enabling the financing of the 
project. 
Finally, reputation is a key intangible asset supporting PF. The sponsor's misconduct affects 
their reputation in limiting their ability to further obtain non-recourse financing (Vinter, Price 
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& Lee, 2013; Gatti, 2018). Sometimes sponsors would rather be at a loss in a venture in order 
to maintain their reputation, which is critical for PF. 
In summary, these four aspects explain why in certain circumstances PF can be inexpensive 
for sponsors and relatively secure for lenders. Moreover, the notion of enforceability is 
paramount in PF because part of the collateral lies on future cash flows generated by the project 
and secured by contracts, concessions and similar enforceable instruments. The legal context 
plays a vital role, concerning PF the most relevant branches of law are: banking, insolvency 
and security, corporate, contract, tort, and construction law.  
2.2 Requirements of PF 
This section focuses on the essential requirements for PF considering two main aspects: (1) the 
completion risk, and (2) the security interest. The features of nuclear projects clash with these 
fundamental requirements; this is why the article focuses extensively on them. 
Firstly, lenders have a negative attitude toward construction risk concerning:  site acquisition 
and access,  permits, risks relating to the EPC Contractor,  construction cost overrun,  revenue 
during construction,  delay in completion,  inadequate performance on completion, and  third-
party risks (Yescombe, 2013). From WKHOHQGHUV¶perspective, the project is bankable if future 
cash flows (or other forms of guarantee) are secured.  In the nuclear sector, the most critical 
stage is the construction phase because the cost amounts to billions of dollars with no positive 
cash flows causing maximum lock-up in the project. Some types of infrastructure can generate 
partial earnings during the construction phase, e.g. a hospital can begin its procedures in 
specific wings, while other areas have not been completed yet. NPPs do not generate any 
revenue until all the facility is fully built, commissioned and approved by an independent safety 
authority called Regulatory Body (RB). 
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Lenders privilege projects characterised by limited completion risk (Tiong Robert L. K., 1995; 
Gatti, 2018), e.g. known technology, limited size projects, established and experienced 
contractors, etc. Usually, all these characteristics do not apply to NPP projects (Barkatullah & 
Ahmad, 2017; Boyd, 2008). In general, lenders attempt to transfer the completion risk from the 
SPV to experienced contractors. Usually, Turnkey - Engineering Procurement Construction 
(TK-EPC) contracts (Clough et al., 2015; Hughes, Champion & Murdoch, 2015; Jr et al., 2014; 
Uff, 2013) are often used as a prime contract between the SPV (i.e. the client) and a qualified 
EPC company (i.e. the main contractor) (Vinter, Price & Lee, 2013). As TK-EPC contracts 
favour the maximum transfer of completion risk from the SPV to the main contractor (or prime 
contractor). Additionally, construction performance is typically secured by insurance, 
performance bonds and similar instruments (Finnerty, 2011). However, it is impossible to 
completely exclude the competition risk, especially in large projects (Merrow, 2011). 
Construction contracts (including the TK-EPC) have provisions limiting the damages that can 
be claimed by the contractor. For example, in the Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) NPP project, the maximum 
penalty clause, for delay, was reflected by the 10% of the project budget, so even though the 
project was several years overdue and severely over budget, the penalty clause will remain 
consistent (Ruuska et al., 2011, 2009). Moreover, in the UK the contracts and construction law 
exclude the use of penalties for the contractor (Uff, 2013; Hughes, Champion & Murdoch, 
2015).  
In practice, it is extremely difficult to transfer entirely the completion risk from the SPV (client) 
to contractors also because of the nature of construction procurement and the contracting 
network. In large infrastructural projects, there are hundreds of companies involved. The prime 
contract between the client and the main contractor is further into subcontracting chains. The 
lower contracting levels are decoupled from the prime contractor consistently with the doctrine 
of privity in contracts (Furmston, 2017). Procurement processes favour the creation of 
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subcontracting chains, leading to a complex and remote3 contractual network. In such cases, 
each contractor transfers most of the risks ³EDFNWREDFN´ from its client to its subcontractor(s) 
(Jr et al., 2014; Hughes, Champion & Murdoch, 2015). Accordingly, some critical provisions 
contained in the sub-contracts mirror the prime contract, i.e. between the client and the prime 
contractor. This shifts the completion risk from the client to remote contractors who are not 
able to transfer the risks to any other actor. The completion risk is quickly dispersed in hundreds 
of small sub-contractors leading to complex risk patterns. For example, a small subcontractor 
might cause economic damage significantly more substantial than its capitalisation, leading to 
its bankruptcy. In such a scenario, the project would be delayed, or even stopped, in order to 
replace the sub-contractor. Additionally, litigation between contractors creates further delays 
as well as cost overruns. The underperformance of the project would hit back the SPV and the 
lenders, making the contractual remedies ineffective. Furthermore, for the doctrine of priority 
in contracts (Furmston, 2017) there would be no contractual obligations between the 
underperforming subcontractor and the SPV.  
In light of this, it is clear that lenders are particularly averse in financing projects characterised 
by relevant completion risk. This negative attitude to completion risk conflicts with nuclear 
projects as further discussed in Section 3.2. 
Secondly, PF has links with insolvency law, particularly concerning the so-called ³security 
interest´ ³A security interest gives a creditor prior propriety rights over an asset ± the 
collateral ±which enables the creditor to realise the collateral to pay the secured debt ahead 
of most other unsecured creditors of the debtor. The security interest is a separatist on 
insolvency, i.e. the collateral does not fall into the pool available for unsecured creditors. A 
                                                 
3
 7KHWHUP³UHPRWH´LVDOHJDOWHUPZLGHO\XVHGLQPDQ\EUDQFKHVRIODZLQFOXGLQJFRQWUDFWWRUWFULPLQDOHWF
In this context, the term refers to the contractual distance between the client and the subcontractors that effectively 
undertake the construction works. 
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security interest is primarily a protection against the insolvency of the debtor since normally 
if the debtor remains solvent the creditor has no need for WKHSULRULW\SURSULHW\ULJKW>«@WKH
essence of security is that the creditor, if unpaid, can force a sale or other realisation on the 
propriety and use the proceHGVWRSD\WKHVHFXUHGGHEWDKHDGRIRWKHUFUHGLWRUV´ (Wood, 2007).  
In PF, little or no collateral is available for securing the project debt. The delivering 
infrastructure is a tangible asset, available only at the end of the construction period. The 
effective guarantees for lenders lie on the enforcing instruments either by securing the revenues 
streams (e.g. off-take contracts) or by providing a temporary monopoly to the SPV (e.g. public 
concessions). Therefore, these intangible assets can be considered an indirect form of collateral 
for the debtor that falls under the definition of security interest. 
Insolvency law is country dependent. Wood classifies the insolvency law regimes showing the 
strong correlation between the legal traditions and the insolvency framework (Wood, 2008, 
2007). Common law jurisdictions (particularly the UK) provide a deregulated context 
IDYRXULQJVHFXULW\LQWHUHVW&RQYHUVHO\1DSROHRQLFDQG,VODPLFMXULVGLFWLRQVGRQ¶WIDYRXUWKH
security interest. Roman-Germanic are mixed jurisdictions as they partly support the security 
interest (Wood, 2008).  
The security interest is a particularly complex topic, and different jurisdictions can be 
compared by a multiplicity of factors. Wood (Wood, 2008, 2007) compared different 
jurisdictions adopting several legal tests, some of the most relevant for PF include:  
1. The scope of security considers which class of assets can be covered by the security interest.  
2. Perfection focuses on ZKHWKHUWKHFUHGLWRUPXVWKDYH³full public possession and delivery 
RIWKHDVVHWV´in order to have security on it.  
3. Secured debt considers whether it is possible to secure future and dynamic assets as 
opposed to real and static ones.  
4. Security trustee considers whether it is possible to employ the instrument of Trust.  
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5. Transfer deems whether the transfer of assets can take place by novation or it requires 
ownership with consequences on the owner balance sheet. Novation is the act of amending 
contracts, i.e. substitute the contract (or part of it) with a new one. 
6. Enforcement contemplates a variety of aspects and procedures associated with the 
execution of the security interest. For instance, enforcement considers whether, during the 
liquidation, the enforcement of security requires a public auction, the involvement of the 
court, a public administrator, or other mechanisms.  
7. Priority toward unsecured creditor focus on the extent to which it is possible to rank ahead 
of secured creditors against unsecured ones.  
8. Costs and taxes consider the general cost of creating security, by carefully viewing taxes, 
legal expenses and administrative fees. 
A strong security interest is essential in PF (Wood, 1995). If the security interest is weak lenders 
are not able to secure their debt and subsequently reluctant to lend the money to the SPV. Other 
banking and insolvency aspects relevant for PF are:  
x The ability to transfer contracts with limited prescriptions and publicity requirements; 
x Favourable insolvency policies for secured creditors.  
Particularly important is the insolvency law regulating the bankruptcy and liquidation 
prRFHVVHVOHDGLQJWRDOWHUQDWLYHURXWHVVXFKDVSULYDWH³ZRUN-RXWV´judicial reorganisations or 
liquidations (Wood, 2007; Finch & Milman, 2017). Equally relevant are the insolvency policies 
distinguishing between various approaches, i.e. set-offs vs close out and settlement nettings 
(Wood, 2007).  
Deregulated contexts favour PF because lenders can introduce sophisticated mechanisms to 
secure their capital with no (or limited) physical collateral (Wood, 2007). When PF transactions 
are negotiated, lenders have strong bargaining powers as they are lending a vast capital to a 
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brand new company (i.e. the SPV) without having collateral or capabilities (Fabozzi, 2012; 
Sainati, Brookes & Locatelli, 2017). In a deregulated context, lenders can counterbalance their 
risk exposition with controlling powers and rights, making projects bankable. Equally 
important is the ability to time and cost-effectively enforce contractual obligations (Vinter, 
Price & Lee, 2013). 
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3. The impact of nuclear law on project financing 
The accidents of Three Miles Island and Chernobyl (IAEA, 1992) raised a global concern 
toward the safety of NPP and the cross-boundary effects of nuclear accidents. The enhanced 
safety requirements, imposed after the accidents, increased the 133V¶construction period and 
costs (Moreira, Gallinaro & Carajilescov, 2013; Koomey & Hultman, 2007). 
Nuclear law lies in international and domestic legal and regulatory frameworks. Internationally, 
two main institutions spear the concerns about safety and security by promoting the ratification 
of multilateral conventions, as well as bilateral treaties, i.e. the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) a branch of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Furthermore, other regional institutions 
such as the European Union promote the development of international law. The international 
nuclear law is relatively consistent in its principles and approaches, due to the vast corpus of 
international nuclear law that covers aspects such as (Nuclear Energy Agency OECD, 2017): 
nuclear safety and radiological protection, emergency response and management, radioactive 
waste management and decommissioning, environmental protection, nuclear security and 
physical protection, non-proliferation, safeguards, liability and compensation for nuclear 
damage, and export control and international trade.  Domestically, each country establishes 
nuclear laws, including the creation of institutions such as RBs (IAEA, 2003b). Domestic 
nuclear law includes detailed administrative rules and regulatory provisions (IAEA, 2002). 
Therefore, nuclear law is made up of hard and soft laws focusing on nuclear-related matters 
(IAEA, 2010b). Nuclear law includes (IAEA, 2002, 2010b): 
1. International law composed of conventions and bilateral treaties; 
2. Domestic law dedicated explicitly to the nuclear-related matters; 
3. Technical regulations issued by tailored administrative bodies; 
4. Non-binding guidelines.  
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Domestic law and the regulatory framework are often classified by two archetypical 
approaches, namely: prescriptive based, and performance-based. The prescriptive based 
approach is founded on detailed mandatory requirements using explicit tests limiting the 
uncertainty of licensing processes. Examples are the French and the Finnish licensing processes 
(Bredimas & Nuttall, 2008; IAEA, 2012; Locatelli et al., 2011). The performance-based 
approach (also called goal setting) is based on general principles and objectives. The 
performance-based approach provides greater flexibility to demonstrate the achievement of the 
safety objective. Performance-based licensing processes are often complemented by extensive 
non-mandatory guidelines to reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity related to the regulatory 
decision-making. One of the best examples of performance-based approach is provided by the 
British licensing process (Bredimas & Nuttall, 2008; IAEA, 2012). 
Nuclear law is a crucial determinant of every nuclear programme (IAEA, 2001, 2010a). The 
RB is a critical stakeholder (IAEA, 2007) having four main responsibilities: (1) Regulating the 
nuclear activities, (2) licensing NPPs, (3) Inspecting (4) enforcing4 uncompliant behaviours. 
Once the RB is ready to fulfil its functions, the first NPPs can initiate the licensing, a pre-
requisite for construction and operation. Licencing is the administrative process where the RB 
(and other institutions) assesses the safety of a NPP design. If successful, the applicant becomes 
licensee by obtaining a nuclear license defined as a ³OHJDOGRFXPHQWLVVXHGE\WKHUHJXODWRU\
body granting authorization to perform specified activities relating to a facility RUDFWLYLW\´
(IAEA, 2016) 
Licensing plays a central role in the regulatory control of NPPs, and it is a critical barrier for 
PF. The licensing process impacts mostly on the construction phase of the NPP, which also 
coincides with the most critical phase for PF as it affects the completion risk directly.  
                                                 
4
 Civil administrative proceedings and fines as opposed to criminal ones that exclusive to the judiciary 
22 
 
Overall, nuclear law plays a fundamental role in the feasibility of PF in the nuclear sector. The 
previous sections described some of the most critical requirements for PF: (1) low completion 
risk, and (2) strong security interest for lenders. These requirements conflict with specific 
features of NPP projects, derived from the legal and regulatory framework: (1) prescriptive 
regulatory requirements, (2) extensive completion risk, and (3) limiting nuclear liability 
regime. Each of these three features is further discussed in the following subsections. 
3.1 Prescriptive regulatory requirements 
The licensing process can impose provisions conflicting with the legal requirement of PF; in 
particular: (1) ownership requirements, (2) indivisibility between operator and licensee, (3) 
capabilities required for the operator/licensee, and (4) financial requirements. These 
requirements can be limiting for PF when codified explicitly, consistently with the prescriptive-
based regulatory approach (Bredimas & Nuttall, 2008; Sainati, Locatelli & Brookes, 2015; 
IAEA, 2010c). 
Firstly, ownership requirements5 are justified for safety and security reasons. Ownership 
requirements focus on nuclear-related assets including the NPP, the nuclear site, the intellectual 
propriety, and the nuclear fuel. Typically, the ³UHDODVVHWV´ can be owned exclusively by the 
operator/licensee; meanwhile, the intellectual propriety has a separate regime; the ownership 
is often shared between the reactor vendor and the operator. Ownership requirements affect 
directly, and indirectly, the security interests of lenders. Directly, lenders cannot use any 
nuclear asset as collateral for their loan. Lenders cannot own nuclear assets or sell them because 
only the operator/licensee is entitled to own them. This is a crucial difference with other energy 
infrastructure. Usually, any type of investor can own a power plant with no or very limited 
restrictions. Conversely, in prescriptive based jurisdictions, the ownership of NPPs requires the 
                                                 
5
 Typically, the ownership requirements are introduced by domestic laws and regulations. For example, in the 
USA, ownership requirements are stated by the Section 104d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and by the 
implementing regulations: Section 50.38 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). 
23 
 
compliance of prescriptive norms that are assessed by the RB for safety and security reasons. 
Typically, the owner of the NPP is the operator/licensee of the facility. Indirectly, ownership 
requirements might constrain the ownership of the operator/licensee to national companies, as 
some countries (e.g. the USA) forbid foreign investors to cover positions of control of the 
utility/ SPV or even the operating of NPPs. In PF, the deputy operator/licensee is the SPV. The 
ownership and control of SPV is a matter of paramount importance for the security interest of 
lenders. Ownership requirements affect the ability of lenders to redeem the project in 
insolvency situations. As a result, ownership requirements alone are a critical barrier to PF 
from the lenders perspective. 
Secondly, indivisibility between the operator and the licensee can be another obstacle for PF. 
Internationally, nuclear laws are based on the principle that the nuclear operator is the nuclear 
licensee (IAEA, 2006b, 2002). In most PF schemes, the operator and the licensee (or 
concessionaire) are separate entities. From the perspective of lenders, the SPV shall not be 
affected by any significant risk, including the operational ones. The relationship between the 
operator and the SPV is formalised by the Operation and & Maintenance contract. This 
argument is critical because the operation of NPP involves greater risks (e.g. technical and 
political risks) compared to other types of power plants (Miller & Lessard, 2001). The inability 
to separate the role of the licensee to the operator affects the security interest of lenders (Section 
3.1). 
Thirdly, capabilities required for the operator/licensee (IAEA, 2010c) could inhibit the 
adoption of PF in nuclear. In PF, the SPV is the deputy to be the operator/licensee. However, 
the SPV has no assets, capabilities or expertise at the time it is incorporated. The explicit and 
prescriptive requirements focusing on the capabilities for the licensee exclude the possibility 
to use the SPV as operator/licensee, which constitutes a significant impediment for PF. 
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Finally, financial requirements focus on the finical solidity of the operator/licensee (IAEA, 
2002). Financial requirements can include: 
x The operator/licensee shall not bankrupt because of the critical safety responsibilities. In 
case of bankruptcy of the operator/licensee, the state undertakes the responsibility of the 
NPP. However, this would be a last resort solution, and the financial requirements aim to 
make this scenario remote; 
x The financial requirements include specific plans for the decommissioning. Usually, the 
legal and regulatory framework imposes a long-term plan aiming to create a 
decommissioning fund during operations.  Financial requirements conflict with the finical 
solidity of the SPV, which is the deputy operator/licensee in PF. Regardless of the amount 
to be paid to for the decommissioning fund, the operator/licensee must demonstrate its 
financial solidity. However, SPVs are characterised by a vast debt and limited collateral for 
the investors, i.e. high financial leverage. The high financial leverage conflicts with the 
most basic financial requirements.  
In summary, the prescriptive regulatory requirements can be a barrier for PF. The requirements 
forbid the SPV to be the operator/licensee, i.e. the capabilities required for the 
operator/licensee, and the financial requirements.  This happens because the SPV is a newly 
incorporated company with no assets or capabilities. Furthermore, the prescriptive 
requirements affect directly the security interest of lenders (section 3.1). Without the support 
of lenders, PF is unlikely to take place.  
3.2 Extensive completion risk characterising nuclear projects 
Usually, PF is suitable for those projects characterised by limited completion risk (Section 2.2). 
However, all recent NPPs developed in, high-income countries, demonstrate a significant 
completion risk (Heffron, 2013). For instance, the OL3 project suffered severe delays and over 
budget due to licensing problems (Ruuska et al., 2009). The construction site was shut several 
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times by the RB. The RB also forced the reconstruction of the base slab due to the inconsistency 
to prescriptive regulatory requirements concerning the porosity of the concrete. The NPP called 
FL3 in France employed the similar technology of OL3. Similarly, FL3 suffered major delays 
and over budget also due to licensing problems (Ruuska et al., 2011). Recently Westinghouse 
was bankrupt due to an over-budget NPP located in the US (Michael & J, 2017). All these 
examples highlight the completion risk in NPP projects derived from the legal and regulatory 
framework. 
In summary, NPP projects are affected by a significant completion risk, making them difficult 
to be financed on a PF basis. The obstacle is particularly critical if considered in conjunction 
with the other barriers discussed in Sections 3.1, 3.3. 
3.3 Limiting nuclear liability regimes characterising nuclear projects 
Internationally, the nuclear sector is characterised by a unique liability framework taking the 
QDPHRI³QXFOHDUOLDELOLW\UHJLPHV´+LVWRULFDOO\the first nuclear liability regime was the Price-
Anderson Act of 1957. Starting from the early stages of nuclear development, several countries 
started LPSOHPHQWLQJ DG KRF ³QXFOHDU OLDELOLW\ UHJLPHV´ (IAEA, 2010b; Nuclear Energy 
Agency OECD, 2017). The accidents of Three Miles Island and Chernobyl fostered the 
expansion of nuclear liability regimes worldwide. Internationally two main regimes evolved, 
one associated with the OECD (which was mainly connected to Europe during the early stages 
of development), and the second associated with the IAEA as summarised in Table 2. Recently 
the IAEA and the OECD promoted a further harmonisation between the two regimes, resulting 
in a third, harmonised nuclear liability regime. 
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OECD Nuclear Liability Regime IAEA Nuclear Liability regime 
Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party 
Liability 1960 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage 1963 
Brussels Convention Supplementary to the 
Paris Convention 1963 
Protocol amending the Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 1997 
Protocols amending the Paris + Brussels 
Supplementary Conventions 2004 
Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1997 
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention 1988 
Table 2: International conventions establishing nuclear liability regimes (Heffron, Ashley & Nuttall, 
2016) 
 
Regardless of the international differences, the three regimes have in common at least seven 
main principles: (1) strict liability, (2) channelling the liability to the operator, (3) limitation of 
liability in time, (4) limitation of liability in amount, (5) mandatory insurance, or other financial 
security, (6) jurisdiction and (7) applicable law (Heffron, Ashley & Nuttall, 2016). 
In all nuclear liability regimes, the nuclear operator/licensee is strictly and exclusively 
responsible for nuclear accidents. The nuclear liability is alleviated by limitations in time and 
amount. These principles are designed to favour legal certainty in case of nuclear accidents, 
allowing clear and efficient compensation for citizens and businesses. Nuclear liability regimes 
substitute the traditional provisions available in tort provisions to the ad hoc provision, which 
are exclusive to the nuclear sector (IAEA, 2002). 
The strict and exclusive liability of the nuclear operator/licensee introduces a further constrain 
limiting the applicability of PF. As described in Section 3, a fundamental design principle of 
PF is the ability to de-risk the SPV. In PF, the SPV acts as the operator/licensee, who cannot 
transfer the risk of nuclear accident to other stakeholders. In practice, the risk is partly shifted 
to mandatory insurances, and it is limited in time and amount. However, the strict and exclusive 
liability reduces the flexibility in transferring the nuclear risks to external contractors. As a 
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consequence, the SPV and lenders must bear part of the nuclear risk, particularly in countries 
where the limitations in amount, exceed the minimum requirements introduced by the 
international nuclear regimes. A remarkable example is Japan where the Fukushima accident 
demonstrated the inconsistency between the amount guaranteed by the international regimes 
and the actual damage of the nuclear accident. Consistently, the third- party liability regimes 
constitute a further obstacle towards PF in the nuclear sector. This barrier is synergic with the 
barriers introduced in the previous Sections 3.1-3.2. 
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
PF is widely applied in the energy infrastructure with exception of the nuclear sector. The paper 
examined the barriers introduced by nuclear law, as well as understanding the characteristics 
of NPPs.  Financing a NPP on PF basis it is possible, but the following barriers inhibit the 
application of PF to NPPs: (1) prescriptive regulatory oversight, (2) vast completion risk, and 
(3) limiting nuclear liability regimes. These three barriers conflict with two PF requirements:(1) 
low completion risk, and (2) strong security interest for lenders. 
The pervasive role of nuclear law is inconsistent with the PF requirements of having a 
deregulated context, particularly on matters such as ownership, control, insolvency, contracting 
and financing. The pervasive role of nuclear law is a significant barrier, particularly when it is 
based on prescriptive mandatory requirements. Conversely, performance-based regulatory 
systems are deemed to be more flexible and can better suits PF compared to prescriptive ones. 
It is possible to overcome or at least mitigate these barriers by hindering PF in the nuclear 
sector. Firstly, a strong banking law, and in particular a strong security interest, is required. 
This aspect does not relate to nuclear law, but it is essential in PF. Secondly, a flexible licensing 
process such as the performance-based approach is more suitable for PF. The traditional 
prescriptive based approach could impose critical obstructions for PF, particularly concerning 
the (1) ownership requirements, (2) indivisibility between operator and licensee, (3) 
capabilities required for the operator/licensee, and (4) financial requirements.  
It is unlikely that PF in the nuclear sector is employed as a pure form of non-recourse financing 
in the short term but in a prescriptive based framework. Most likely, the PF transactions would 
require the support (in the financial sense) of actors such as the Government in the form of 
credit enhancement such as credit guarantees schemes. This is consistent with the Hinkley 
Point C (HPC) in the UK, which is the first attempt of PF in the nuclear sector ýHUQRFK	
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Zapletalová, 2015; IAEA, 2014). HPC is characterised by two main forms of public support. 
Firstly the contract for different secures at a fixed price of the electricity generated for 30 years 
(Taylor, 2016; GOV.UK, 2016). Secondly, a public fund guarantees the project leaders against 
the default of the SPV (National Audit Office, 2015).  The public support is befitting also 
because the application of PF to NPP is relatively recent and would require some prior 
experience to convince private investors, who are primarily concerned by completion risk, 
especially since the track record of nuclear project performance in the past has been mediocre. 
The impediments of PF in the nuclear sector have implications for energy law and its 
consistency. In order to be an autonomous and holistic legal domain, energy law would require 
consistency between different sub-domains. Generally, the seven principles characterising 
energy law (Section 1.1) should apply to nuclear law. The practical application of these 
principles relays extensively on the stages of development of energy law, which are: stage 1 ± 
safety, stage 2 - energy security, stage 3 - economic development, stage 4 - energy 
infrastructure development, and stage 5 - energy justice. While most energy technologies are 
found between stage 4 and 5, nuclear law seems to be focused almost exclusively on safety and 
security, which is yet the first stage of the stages of development of energy law. This focus is 
justified after the major nuclear accidents that occurred, including Chernobyl in 1986 and 
Fukushima in 2011. However, the international trend in energy law does not seem completely 
reflected in nuclear law. To enhance the consistency within the holistic energy law, nuclear 
law should progress toward the later stages of development of energy law. 
For instance, energy law should evolve to favour the development of nuclear infrastructure, in 
line with stage 4. Amending the nuclear law does not mean compromising on critical matters 
such as nuclear safety and security. Conversely, amending the nuclear law would reflect a more 
holistic and balanced set of objectives including the smooth development of energy 
infrastructure, which would be facilitated with small and ad hoc changes meanwhile not 
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compromising, affecting the nuclear safety and security. For example, this paper assessed the 
feasibility of PF in the nuclear sector by identifying the challenges to overcome, particularly in 
relation to nuclear law. Overcoming these challenges would strengthen the consistency within 
the sub-domains composing energy law. Additionally, enabling PF in nuclear would promote 
a low carbon energy technology, therefore promoting the JUST transition of energy systems. 
Enabling PF in nuclear is a practical improvement to nuclear law. It is also a pragmatic example 
showing how a branch of energy law can affect at least two (out of seven) principles of energy 
law, namely: (1) protection of the environment, human health & combatting climate change, 
(2) energy security and reliability. Firstly, overcoming the barriers to PF would promote the 
development of NPPs, reducing the carbon footprint of energy production. Secondly, nuclear 
is a dispatchable, reliable and secure technology to produce power and electricity, which is 
often not deployed for financial constraints. The empowerment of these (and others) energy 
law principles is interdisciplinary. For instance, nuclear technology provides intrinsic potential 
in terms of carbon emissions, reliability and energy security. However, without a synergic 
integration with the financing mechanisms, and the legal system, this potential is hard to 
materialise.  
This paper advocates to further integration between energy law, and other disciplines, to 
overcome the practical impediments to JUST transition. Further researches can highlight the 
barriers to JUST transition for other infrastructure as well as the gaps between energy law and 
the other disciplines, such as finance, engineering and social sciences. The identification of 
these barriers and gaps it is a critical step to improve energy law and to enable the JUST 
transition.  
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